

**AN EXPLORATION OF THE “POLITICIZATION
CONCEPT OF PUTNAM:
DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES OF CITIZENS
ABOUT FOREIGN POLICIES**

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Introduction

Since very earlier days of political sciences, relation among polities became a significant area of scientific inquiry. With the emergence of the concept of nation state, concept of polity has been replaced by this new concept and label of the study became “international relations”. This labelling of the study brings many limitations upon students of political sciences. First of all, since relations are mutually inclusive with relations among nations via diplomacy, the scientific study remained limited with the study of diplomacy, even the diplomatic history. However, after 1950s, a challenge came to this approach and interaction between domestic and international spaces became an area of scientific study.

In this paper, the major aim of the author to investigate this relationship between domestic and international by using a framework created by Robert Putnam: two level game, especially by emphasizing on his conception of politicization. In the first part of the paper, a short review of some fundamental concepts will take place. If the reader is familiar with Putnam’s framework, definition of politicization and dynamics of politicization, may skip these parts. In the second part, theoretical framework obtained from the theoretical part will be employed in order to analyze a specific case, S300 missiles crisis between Greece and Turkey in January 1997. This empirical part of the paper will consist of a short chronology of events, political environment of Turkey during this crisis, a review of politicians’ contribution to the crisis and a survey research.

Theory

This part of the paper is largely based on Robert Putnam's article **Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games** (1988). Putnam's article is important because it deals with the puzzle of "how and when domestic and international interacts?". According to Putnam, "neither a purely domestic nor a purely international analysis could account for this episode" (Putnam, 1988:430). Putnam offers a two-level game framework in order to conceive the politics of many international negotiations. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as their countries remain independent, yet sovereign (ibid.:434).

Putnam operationalizes this process of interaction of two different levels as "ratification process". Ratification is the process in which discussion within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. Ratification process may entail a formal voting procedure such as parliamentary approval or may be an informal procedure. Putnam introduces his crucial concept, the "win-set". According to Putnam, the "win-set" is the set of all possible Level II coalitions to ratify Level I agreement, when simply voted up or down (ibid.:437).

Putnam states that larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely. "By definition, any successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of parties to the accord. Thus, agreement is possible only if those win-sets overlap, and the larger each win-set, the more likely they are to overlap" (ibid.).

Moreover, size of the win-set is important because the “relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the Joint gains from the international bargain. The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more he can be “pushed around” by other Level I negotiators”.

According to Robert Putnam, any testable two level theory of international negotiation must be rooted in a theory of domestic politics, that is a theory about the power and preferences of the major actors at Level II. The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II constituents such as interest groups, bureaucracy, political parties and others.

First important determinant of effects of domestic politics on the win-set is the cost of “no-agreement” or the status quo for constituents. Some constituents may face low costs from “no-agreement” and others high costs, and the former will be more skeptical of Level I agreements than the latter. For example, in Putnam’s words, members of two wage earner families should be readier to strike than sole bread winners.

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This concept of the cost of "no-agreement" is crucial for Putnam's framework, since it is the sole determinant of the size of the win-set in some cases in which interests of the Level II constituents are relatively homogenous, for example in limiting oil imports by the consuming nations. Then, only disagreement among domestic constituents will take place between "hawks" and "doves", who are less and more reluctant to the loss of the agreement depending their relative elasticity against the strike. These cases are labeled as "boundary conflicts", because the negotiator is caught between his constituency and the external organization.

In some other cases, interests of Level II constituents are relatively heterogenous, so that any Level I agreement will be opposed by ones who think it goes to far, and ones who think it does not go far enough. This type of conflict is labeled as "factional conflicts" since the negotiator is caught between contending factions within his own organization.

In the former case, Level I negotiator is face to face to maximize its benefits, since the chance of ratification of the agreement depends the amount obtained from the negotiations. Putnam rephrase this fact as follows "the more the negotiator can win at Level I ... the better his odds of winning ratification" (ibid.: 444). Only problem that Level I negotiator faces is the discrepancy between his constituents' expectations and the negotiable outcome. Constituents will be intolerable against demands of the enemy (in Putnam's words). Consequently, the risk of involuntary defection will be raised and impede agreement at Level I.

In the case of factional conflicts, Level I negotiator is not able to follow a strategy of “the more, the better”. These lines of cleavage within the Level II constituencies will cut across the Level I division and the Level I negotiator may find “silent” allies at his opponent’s domestic table. Thus, transnational alignments may emerge (implicit or explicit), in which domestic interest pressure their respective governments to adopt mutually supportive policies. In these cases, domestic cleavages may improve the prospects of international cooperation if Level I negotiator is able to manage cleavages to assure a slight majority to support international cooperation (ibid.).

The second important factor that determines the size of the win-set is the politicization of the issue. Politicization often activates groups who are less worried about the costs of no-agreement, thus reducing the effective win-set. This “politicization” dimension of the two level game frame work will be discussed in details in the following parts of the paper.

Second group of factors that affect the size of the size of the win-set is labeled as “institutions”. First of these institutions is the ratification procedures. For example if a two-thirds of vote in the parliament is required for ratifications, the size of the win-set will be smaller than if only a simple majority is required. If the ratification procedure gives an effective veto power to a minor group, in Putnam’s words “... increases the bargaining power of American negotiators, but it also reduces the scope for international cooperation. It raises the odds for involuntary defection and makes potential partners warier about dealing with the Americans” (ibid.: 448).

Other domestic political practices may also affect the size of the win-set. For example, strong discipline within the governing party increases the win set by widening the range for agreements for which the Level I negotiator can expect to

receive support. On the other side, a weakening of party discipline, *ceteris paribus*, reduce the scope for international cooperation.

The “state strength” and “state autonomy” are also relevant factors that affect the size of the win-set. If the state is more autonomous, the win-set is larger and the likelihood of achieving international agreement will be higher. Nonetheless, the stronger a state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, *ceteris paribus*, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally (ibid.: 449).

Since each players of the Level I game are motivated to maximize its gains by enlarging the other side’s win-set, but with respect to his own win-set; strategies of Level I negotiators gain a significant importance as the determinant of the win-sets. In order to enlarge the size of his win-set and thus to encourage ratification of an , the negotiator may exploit both conventional side payments and generic “good will” (ibid.: 450).

Putnam argues that “the value of an international side-payment should be calculated in terms of its marginal contribution to the likelihood of ratification rather than in terms of its overall value to the recipient nation” and “an experienced negotiator familiar with the respective domestic tables should be able to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the concessions that he must make to ensure ratification abroad, as well as the cost effectiveness of his own demands and threats, by targeting his initiatives with an eye to their Level II incidence, both at home and abroad” (ibid.: 450-451).

Putnam's Politicization Concept

Since the major aim of this paper is to discuss the determinants of attitudes towards foreign policy issues; some parts of Putnam's framework such as political institutions at Level II and strategies of Level I actors, will not be emphasized and discussed. In this part of the paper, an attempt to enlarge and define the concept of "politicization" that is not emphasized by Robert Putnam. In his state-of-art article, Putnam defines effects of politicization as follows: "politicization often activates groups who are less worried about the costs of no-agreement, thus reducing the effective win-set" and gives the example of the Panama Canal issue: "[f]or example, politicization of the Panama Canal issue seems to have reduced the negotiating flexibility on both sides of the diplomatic table". And he argues: "[t]his is one reason why most professional diplomats emphasize the value of secrecy to successful negotiations" (ibid.:445).

Although that this description of the concept gives us some cue-cards about its nature and recipients, it remains limited in making a clear definition that allows a possible explanation of reasons and results of the "politicization" concept. This underestimation of this concept may be stemmed by its relatively weaker position as a determinant of the size of the win-set, or its relative insignificance for the author since he emphasized on the nature of international negotiations and domestic policy. In the following part of the paper, a search for an operational definition of this concept will take place.

Political Dictionary of Fast Times gives definition of the concept as follows: "politicization - the giving of a political character to something. For example, if a debate over some previously non-political issue becomes divided along party political lines, this would be a politicization of the debate".

According to Richard M Ebelin, Vice President of Academic Affairs of The Future of Freedom Foundation, politicization can be defined as that now pervasive tendency for making all questions political questions, all issues political issues, all values political values, and all decisions political decisions.... Politicization thus takes the manifest form of increasing the power of the state, of increasing political power as against all other forms of power in society, of increasing the power of the politicians and the bureaucrats as against the power of individuals, private institutions, and voluntary associations.... Today the individual ... is constantly aware of the state, over which he can exercise little or no control even though it makes more and more decisions about his life” (Ebelin, 1995)

Van Der Meer et.al (1997) uses the concept within the framework of evolution of the Dutch civil service with two different dimensions: First dimension is labelled as “the politicization of recruitment”, and defined as “the employment of political criteria in the recruitment process”. According to the development of a (mature) party system, it is possible to speak of 'party-political' appointments. Second dimension is described as follows:

“The second perspective on politicization is derived from examining political behavior of civil servants. The political behavior of the civil servants may indicate a lot thing at the same time. Politics can be defined in a narrow (party political) and a more extensive (the power to influence policymaking) manner. First civil servants can be sensitive to societal demands and aware of the democratic and political nature of their job. Furthermore it can include the perception that the (top) civil service constitutes an important actor on the political scene in its own right. Finally, apart from the political power of bureaucracy, civil servants can operate as (party) politicians serving and promoting their own ideas and interests. Politicization of

behavior can and does pertain in essence to all strata of the civil service. Although discussions on civil servants as important political actors is mainly concentrated on the role of higher civil servants, the other dimensions are equally important to for instance 'street level bureaucrats' and to those civil servants active in areas of policy implementation with discretionary powers”.

Merrel et al. (1997) defines politicization as allocation of resources by politicians without considering costs of their actions on citizens. According to Merrel et al. “[w]ith market allocation consumers may ignore the benefits or costs their actions provide others. With political allocation legislators may ignore the costs that taxes and regulations impose on citizens. The efficiency of political markets determines the extent to which politicians consider the costs imposed on unorganized citizens. But whatever the efficiency of political markets, politicization is less likely to improve welfare when consumers have a relatively large stake in a decision. If the bulk of the costs and benefits of an action fall on the market decision maker, the gain from imposing regulations is small”.

According to Carment and James, (1997) politicization is a result of lower level of institutionalization. “All post-communist states in Eastern and Central Europe, to varying degrees, suffer from a sense of insecurity that derives directly from the weakness of governmental and political structures. Democratic institutions are fragile, economic transitions are ambiguous and societal loyalties are fragmented. These factors reduce the effectiveness and impartiality of the military; because of its relatively simple and hierarchical command structure, sensitive issues cannot be depoliticized. Politicization of the command structure causes the military to look for allies within civilian political structures in order to control rebellious minorities”.

According to Neuhaus (1994); “[w]e have most clearly experienced this emerging totalism in the oft-heard lament that 'everything is becoming politics,' from education to morality to relations between the sexes. Such politicization is an inevitable result of the manner in which American liberalism conceives of the 'public-private' distinction. That is, in protecting only a certain understanding of privacy, and doing so by advancing a doctrine of politically administered individual rights, a uniform politicization of all spheres of human interest occurs. Thus, all human relations begin to resemble the relations of the political sphere, and these relations in turn are modelled on the contracts of the marketplace, for significantly, the preeminent Lockean rights are the rights of private property and economic freedom”.

These different definitions of the concept has a common definition of life: The life is consisted of two different spheres: a political sphere and a non-political one. If borders of these two different spheres become weakened and these spheres became confused, and perhaps, non-political sphere becomes dominated by the political one, this situation is labelled as the politicization. Despite this consensus about the division, ingredients of non-political sphere are matters of discussion. For a group of students of social sciences, non-political sphere is consisted of cultural, educational, religious and other activities. Good examples are given above as cultural activities of Ebelin and religion of Neuhaus. For another group, non-political sphere is a part of administrative organization to which intervention of politicians is not tolerable. Examples of this second group are given above as the bureaucracy of Van Der Meer et. al, resource allocation of Merret et al. and the military of Carment and James.

By using these common elements of these different definitions of the concept, it is possible to make a clearer definition and description of the politicization concept within the framework of international relations. First of all, since politicization is

defined as the intervention of politicians to the non-political sphere; logical consequence of using term of “politicization of an international issue” is the assumption that politicians intervened to a non-political issue, that is an international issue. Consequently, whole international relations or a part of it composes a non-political sphere. In other words, when politicians intervenes to an issue of international relations, it becomes politicized. However, intervention to non-political sphere is not the single prerequisite of the politicization. As it has been observed above, intervention of politicians is considered synonymous with intervention of politicians in order to maximize their benefits, since the major aim of politicians is implicitly defined as to maximize their benefits. Benefits of politicians to be maximized may be classified under two broad but not meaningless categories: a) to increase their powers in broader terms and b) to maximize their voter’ support in order to maximize their chances of to be re-elected. First of these categories, to maximize their powers has been largely discussed by the school of **Bureaucratic Politics**.¹ Since we interested in the concept of politicization within the two-level game framework of Putnam who argues that politicization of an issue may result on reducing the size of the win-set, despite a possible effect of the bureaucratic politics to the win-set coalition exists, it can not be critically so effective to effect ratification possibility of the agreement. Consequently, this first type of these categories, the broader definition of benefits of politicians, is not a matter of our discussion.

Nevertheless, the narrower definition of politics is significant for our discussion. Major benefit of politicians has been defined as to maximize their voter’ support in order to maximize their chance to be re-elected. Following this definition, it is possible to broaden our basic definition, by arguing that when politicians intervene to international issues in order to maximize their benefits, it is politicization. History of

international relations consists of many good examples of this type of action of politicians. For example, military intervention of Bush administration in the Gulf War just prior to the presidential elections of 1992 has been largely defined a movement of Bush to maximize its voter support. Another example of this action is the visit of Erbakan to Libya in 1996. Many students of political science argued that this visit was a move of Erbakan in order to consolidate its constituency in order to maximize its voter support. It is possible to give many different examples of this type of action, but it is beyond of our scope.²

This new definition of the “politicization” leads us to ask some further questions: If the politicization of an international issue, is the use of this issue by politicians in order to maximize their benefits (votes), why are all international issues not politicized? Is there any selection mechanism of politicians? Are all of international issues equally politicized, or is there a significant difference of politicization between them? If there is a variation of politicization of international issues, what causes this variation? Moreover, are all of these international issues always politicized? Or, is there any fluctuation of politicization of international issues over time? These different questions may be summarized into two basic questions: When do politicization occurs and which issues are more tendful to be politicized? Since benefits of politicians are equated with maximizing their votes in order to be re-elected; it is possible to answer these questions by understanding how politicians maximize their votes. In the following part of the paper, a framework to understand and analyze politicians’ benefits will be drawn and questions cited above will be answered by employing this framework.

Dynamics of Inter-party Competition

The major aim of this part of this paper is to build a theoretical framework in order to understand effects of inter-party competition on politicization that is defined above. This theoretical framework will be based upon the “rational choice” school of thought that has been face to face with serious criticisms since its very early days. Nevertheless, since contributions of this the “rational choice” school to the theory of inter-party competition are undoubtedly significant; it is possible to argue that the “rational choice” school has an important power of explanation to inter-party competition. In the following parts of the paper, components of the politicization depending to inter-party competition will be discussed by first reviewing basic arguments of the “rational choice” school through emphasizing on some milestone works of Downs, Robertson, Budge and Farlie and later generating testable hypotheses about the relationship between inter-party competition and the politicization.

According to Downs, a political party is a team consisted of people who aim to control the government agency by winning elections. Major motivation behind political activities of people is to have rewards of a certain office rather than only controlling this office. Consequently, political parties formulate policies in order to winning elections, they do not win election to formulate policies. The governing party arranges its policies and activities in order to maximize its vote without disturbing the constitutional order (Downs, 1957:25-31).

Since major aim of political parties is to win election rather than building an ideal society, they use ideologies according to this aim rather than a tool of verbalizing the ideal society. Major reason behind use and relative significance of ideologies by political parties in the process of inter-party competition lays upon the fact that we are

living in an uncertain world. As a result of this uncertainty, voters are unable to know exact consequences of their decisions. Moreover, forecasting problems of the next term and how to solve these problems is not an easy task for the voter. Thus, many voters employ ideologies in order to minimize this uncertainty. Because, thanks to ideologies, the voter deliberates of having the knowledge of exact position of his/her party in every issue and becomes able to understand differences between political parties through comparing their ideological positions. In the process of elections, the voter compares different ideologies and chooses the most preferable for him/her (ibid.:98).

Use of ideologies by the voter in this manner has two important consequences. First of all, as a result of employment of ideologies in order to distinguish differences between political parties, the nature of elections and inter-party competition change. Elections emphasize on ideologies rather than issues. Secondly, political parties that are aware of how voters employ ideologies, prefer to advocate ideologies that will attract the maximum number of votes. Since we are living in an uncertain world, the idyllic ideology that will maximize number of voters, variation of ideologies from one party to another is normal. Inter-party competition is meaningful thanks to this variation (ibid.:98-100).

Most important contribution of Downs to the theory of inter-party competition is its argument about the rationality of voters and political parties that gives us power of explaining behavior of voters. However, the most important argument of Downs is his the most criticized point. Secondly, role attributed to ideologies as a part of inter-party competition is the second significant contribution of the author. Logical consequences of the argument that ideology is the most important determinant of differences between political parties form many testable hypotheses for students of political

sciences. In the following parts of the paper, these contributions of Downs will be used to understand effects of competition between parties on the politicization of an international issue.

It is argued that arguments of Downs have been often heavily criticized. Nevertheless, in this paper, it is preferred to emphasis on criticisms that expand and evaluate his theory rather than attempt to destroy his works. One of the most important of these works is "A Theory of Party Competition" of David Robertson. Most important contribution of Robertson to Downs is about the goals of political parties. Robertson, opposing to Downs who argues that major aim of political parties is to control the government through elections; says that major aims of political parties is to solve existing problems through controlling the government. Consequently, a) political parties compete in the basis of their solution offerings to existing problems and b) a political party can continue to advocate its solutions without necessitating winning elections. (Robertson, 1957:18)

A logical consequence of the argument that political parties offer solutions to existing problems, is that the competition between political parties becomes in terms of competing different solutions offered to existing different problems rather than competing ideologies. In other words, opposing to Downsian argument, issues are significant in inter-party competition. According to Robertson, election campaigns begin with a description of existing social and economic situation of the society. Following this description of existing problems, political parties ask for their authorization to solve these problems. The voter will make his/her decision after considering these different solutions (ibid).

The second logical consequence of Robertson's argument that political parties continue to advocate their policies regardless winning or losing elections. According

to Downs, all political parties advocate policies that will maximize their votes. In a unidimensional space, this argument results on convergence of political parties in a single point, namely the median voter. In a two-party system, parties will approach each other around the median voter, while in a multi-party system they will surpass each other (leapfrogging) (ibid.:21). Consequently, political parties have unlimited moving capability across unidimensional ideological space. According to Robertson, this kind of unlimited mobility is impossible. First important reason of limited capability of mobility, is the fact that contrary to Downsian argument, politics are not limited to politicians and voters, activists of political parties who support political parties through donations or making field works are also involved to the political life. If a political party moves a certain point in the ideological space that is not acceptable by these activists, it will loose its supporters. In short, these activists limit mobility of political parties. Another consequence of the existence of these activists is the fact that political parties have not to advocate policies that will attract maximum number of voters. To attract an additional number of voters to loyal supporters of the party is sufficient to win the election.

Most important contribution of Robertson to Downs is the significance of issues in determining outcomes of elections. This significance of issues will help us to understand why an international issue becomes politicized.

Another issue about the theory of competition between political parties is the relationship between employment of issues or ideologies on dynamics of inter-party competition by reviewing some arguments of Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie.

In his works of "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition", Budge states that ideologies are important tools for political parties. Because political leaders may emphasize on their differences by accentuating their discrepancies in ideologies.

According to Budge, mobility of parties is limited with ideologies. Parties can not transfer ideologies of other political parties. Ideologies are significant not only as references for different issues but also as reflectors of differences in the social life. Moreover, parties may justify their positions by standing to ideologies (Budge, 1994:443).

In his work with Farlie, "Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation", Budge argues that political parties may use issues in two different manners: Political parties have solutions to every problems and these solutions become matters of discussion during the electoral campaign, or political parties emphasize on certain issues that are the most advantageous for them .When voter decides which issues are more crucial for him/her, his/her choice becomes automatically determined(Budge and Farlie, 1983:271) Authors provide empirical data that show that political parties tend to emphasize on some issues (ibid.:276).

Budge and Farlie became successful to make a synthesis of arguments of Downs and Robertson's approaches: ideologies are important as reference sources and reflecting societal differences. Hence, party strategists choose the most advantageous issues in formulating their strategy of electoral campaigns. Consequently, it is possible to argue that both of ideologies and issues are important for political parties.

Party Competition and Politicization

It is previously argued that parties emphasise on issues, which maximize their votes as a specific solution to a societal solution, or as cue cards to their ideological positions in order to differentiate themselves of other political parties. Our previous definition of politicization leads us to operationalize politicization as a point in time in which all political parties declared different positions in the same international issue. If all

political parties would take same position in the same issue, it would not possible to talk about the politicization of this issue since marginal contribution of declaration of political parties that they are at the same position with all of other political parties is insignificant. Thus, from this perspective, politicization is synonymous with fragmentation. Consequently, our main question takes the form of “under what conditions, political parties’ positions in an international issue become fragmented”.

It is possible to answer this question by using tools provided by the Rational Choice school. Following Robertson’s argument that political parties emphasize on issues as specific solutions to specific societal problems, we can argue that fragmentation of political parties in a certain international issue occurs as follows: If political parties take different positions in the same issue, it means that they have different solutions to the same political problem. In the contrary case in which political parties offer same solution to the same political problem, all of them would be converged at the same point in the unidimensional issue space. Since it is assumed that political parties are rational actors that seek to maximize their votes, this divergence of political parties in solutions may be a result of divergence of the electorate in this issue. If attitudes of the electorate towards a certain issue are fragmented, it is not surprising that political parties’ solutions to this issue are also fragmented. To summarize, we can say that fragmentation of political parties in a certain issue is dependent to the fragmentation of the electorate in this issue. Consequently, politicization of an international issue occurs when the society is fragmented in this issue. This explanation implicitly assumes that the electorate is fragmented in this international issue because of non-political reasons.

Another answer to this question by the Rational Choice school bases upon Downs’ argument that political parties compete in the ideological basis rather than issues.

Political parties formulate ideologies, voters use these ideologies in order to understand positions of their political parties in specific issues. Following this argument, we can say that fragmentation of political parties in a certain international issue is a result of ideological differences of these political parties. Since competing political parties are ideologically diverged, their positions in a specific issue are also diverged. Consequently, fragmentation of political parties is a result of their ideological fragmentation.

A third explanation to fragmentation of political parties in a certain issue and subsequent politicization of the issue may be given by using approaches of Budge and Farlie. According Budge and Farlie, politicians use both of issues and ideologies simultaneously in order to maximize their votes. They use ideologies in order to underline their differences than other political parties and these divergence of ideologies are outputs of societal differences. However, politicians also use issues for creating advantages for themselves. They selectively emphasize on issues in which they are most advantageous and de-emphasize on others. Following this argument, we can say that fragmentation of political parties stems from a) divergence of their ideologies and b) differences of marginal contribution of declaration of their position in a specific issue to their votes. If an issue is advantageous for a political party, it emphasizes on this issue. Elsewhere, it does not emphasize. First of all, differences between emphases of political parties stems from this variation of advantages. Secondly, political parties may use issues as references to their ideologies. In order to consolidate its overall ideological position, a political party may emphasize on a certain issue and declare its position in this issue. From this point of view, issues function as “acid-tests” that clarify ideological position of a party. Consequently, fragmentation of political parties may be stemmed from several different reasons. It

may stem from ideological divergence of political parties, variation of advantages or disadvantages of the issue for political parties or need for ideological clarification of political parties. First of these reasons has been largely discussed in the first part of this chapter based on Robertson's argument. Advantages and disadvantages of political parties are largely related with their overall ideological positions. Need for ideological clarification depends to overall structure of the party system and increase when differences between political parties seem to disappear and party strategists need to underline their differences in order to increase their vote, consolidate their electoral support and political activists who are largely motivated thanks to differences between political parties.

Following these different explanations it is possible to draw some testable hypotheses:

An international issue is politicized,

- 1) because of heterogenous attitudes of the electorate towards this issue.
- 2) as a result of ideological fragmentation of political parties.
- 3) because some of political parties decided to emphasize on this issue in order to
 - i) use their advantages on this issue
 - ii) clarify their ideological differences than other parties.

How to Measure Politicization?

In the empirical part of this paper, these hypotheses will be tested. However, before making such an analysis, it is needed to take some further steps about the methodology. First of these steps is to make an operationalization of the concept within the framework of previous parts of the paper.

Politicization has been defined as “the use of an issue by politicians in order to maximize their votes”. Here, the problem is how to measure politicization. In this paper, results of a survey research will be employed to measure how much an issue is politicized. Since it is argued that politicization is equivalent to fragmentation of political parties in a given issue, in the highest level of politicization, it is expected that voters also fragmented in this issue and positions of voters of a given party is close to the position of this party. A good example of politicization is visible with the question of “which of following political parties is able to govern the country”. It is not surprising that every political party advocates that it is the most capable to govern the country. And, it is not also surprising that supporters of political parties advocate that their political parties will best govern the country. In other words, correlation between positions of political parties and positions of supporters of these parties is near to 1. It is not possible to find any other independent variable better than positions of political parties that explain position of individual voters in this issue. The opposing example is about the relationship between “most favored football team” and political party preferences. Under normal conditions, it is not possible to find any relationship between these two variables. Correlation coefficient is about 0. There are many other factors that crosscut the relationship between party identification and football fanship. If this coefficient increases, it means politicization.

Consequently, it is possible to argue that politicization may be measured by comparing explanatory power of different variables. If variance explained by party identification is higher than variance explained by other independent variables, it is possible about talk about politicization.

Since we are dealing with the politicization of international issues, this operationalization of politicization leads us to make a further work before the

empirical part of the paper. We expect that if an international issue is politicized, explanatory power of party identification will be higher than other variables. Here, the major question is what other variables that effect position of voters in a given issue are. In order to answer this question, in the next part of the paper, a review of other different variables that expected to explain attitudes towards international issues would take place.

Determinants of Attitudes Towards Foreign Policy Issues

Since there is no meaningful research about origins of foreign policy attitudes of Turkish citizens, we have to emphasize on the literature on other people's foreign policy attitudes, especially on the American literature. However, works from this literature is not innumerable. First of these works is conducted by Almond in 1950, and led him to the conclusion that "foreign policy attitudes among most Americans lack intellectual structure and factual content. Under normal circumstances the American public has tended to indifferent to questions of foreign policy because of their remoteness from every day interests and activities... Foreign policy, save in moments of grave crisis, has to labor under a handicap; it has to shout loudly to be heard even a little" (Almond, 1950: 69-71). This "mood theory" has been supported also by works of many scholars: "the pervasive assumption has been that foreign policy attitudes are based on exceedingly little information, are lacking in structure and stability and are unrelated to important political choices such as the vote" (Hurwitz et. al, 1993:246; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987:1101).

Recent works in the field challenged this "mood theory" of Almond and his students. Famous political scientist Verba demonstrated that "the correlational analysis among scales shows patterns of consistency among population" (Hurwitz and Peffley:ibid.).

Following this argument, many students of political science showed that foreign policy attitudes are highly related with an unidimensional continuum. This continuum is labeled as “hawks-doves” or “liberal-conservative” continuum (ibid.). According to students of this school, foreign policy attitudes of one is determined as a result of his position in this continuum. Similar to the functions attributed to ideologies by Downs, this continuum serves as an important tool that reduces uncertainty and facilitates taking positions towards international issues about which voters are not expected to be sufficiently informed (Hill, 1993:197).

Challenge to this school came from within it. A group of scholars, led by Hurwitz and Peffley. According to them, “...the studies do not assume that foreign policy attitudes are structured unidimensionally along the same liberal-conservative continuum on which attitudes in other domains fall. Rather, with few exceptions, people were found to use multiple dimensions to organize their foreign policy beliefs -dimensions specific to the domain of foreign affairs, such as militarism, isolationism and liberal internationalism, to name but a few” (Hurwitz and Peffley, ibid.:1102). These scholars proposed an alternative model that is labelled as “the hierarchical model”:

“American’s attitudes on a host of specific foreign policy issues are closely predicted by more general foreign policy postures. These postures are the individual’s generalized preferences for the conduct of foreign policy, but do not indicate which specific policies should be adopted. Three key postures were found to be strong predictors of attitudes on specific foreign policy issues: militarism, anti communism and isolationism.... A set of more general beliefs, or core values was found to underlie this foreign policy postures. Specifically core values such as patriotism and a belief in morality and immorality of warfare were found to predict foreign policy postures” (Hurwitz et. al., ibid.: 247).This so-called “hierarchical model” as a

“cognitive heuristics” tool that helps citizen to process foreign-policy information (Hurwitz and Peffley, *ibid.*:1987)

Despite its strong empirical basis, this approach failed to explain the phenomena from some perspectives. First of all, it employs “the hierarchy of values” as the independent to explain foreign policy attitudes, to predict which positions will be taken by citizens. However, it fails to explain why and how citizens choose these values. Thus its independent variable remains as a black box. Secondly, core values stated by authors are questionable from a universalistic perspective. Are these values spatio-temporally valid? Are these core values and postures of a Ghana citizen same with American citizens? Were they valid for an American citizen of 19th century? These questions remain unanswered and external validity of this concept of core values remains questionable. This approach is great in explaining what determines specific positions: foreign policy postures and core values. However it fails to explain what determines foreign policy postures and core values.

Here, the major question becomes which social or economic factors shape foreign policy attitudes. A review of these demographic factors is exposed by Hill:

“First, rural dwellers and especially Southerners have tended to adopt hard-line foreign policy positions, especially regarding military issues.... Second, nearly all studies find that both hawkishness and isolationism increase as age increases. One must be cognizant that, aside from demographics, education and partisanship, the foreign policy attitudes literature has sought to explain very few linkages between foreign policy opinions in the public, and domestically derived explanations for those opinions.... As has been the case with most forms of behavioral studies in the United States, socio-economic status and especially education have been best predictors of the directionality of foreign policy attitudes” (Hill, *ibid.*:199).

Hurwitz and Peffley states that:

“.... he (Converse) found virtually no systematic or predictable difference between Democrats and Republicans on foreign policy issues. And with the exception of isolationist sentiments, foreign policy opinions have not been found to be connected to social status”(Hurwitz and Peffley, *ibid.*:1103).

Following these short review about different arguments about determinants of foreign policy attitudes, it is possible to expose some independent variables that have potential to effect foreign policy positions of citizens: age, education, socio-economic status, gender and value system. However, since “core values” of American citizens are defined through empirical methods, it is not easy to find a functional equivalent concept without replicating these works in Turkey and it is beyond the scope of this paper.

Empirical Findings

In this part of the paper, empirical findings about effects of politicization on foreign policy attitudes will be exposed under three main parts. First of all, a chronology of events will be presented in order to inform readers who are not familiar with the S-300 missiles crises between Turkey and Greece. Secondly, after a short discussion of political environment in Turkey that has potential effects on the politicization, positions of major political parties in this crisis will be discussed. Finally, results of a survey research conducted in September 1997 will be exposed in order to discuss politicization and other determinants of foreign policy attitudes.

However, at the beginning of this empirical part, I want to emphasize on some critical points about the Cyprus issue in general and analysis of foreign policy attitudes of Turkish citizens.

Greek question and Cyprus problem have ever been important points in Turkish foreign policy. In addition to inherited hostility between Turkey and Greece since mid 19th century, invasion of Turkey at the end of the First World War and subsequent “independence war” of Turkey against Greece created important injuries in the nature of relationship between these two neighboring countries. Despite personnel efforts of political leaders such as Atatürk, Venizelos who signed an agreement “inagurating a new era of peace and co-operation between these two historic adversaries” (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994:120), emerging problems such as the Aegean continental shelf problem, Turkish minorities in Greece and the Cyprus issues, enfostered this hostility between turkey and Greece, and these two members of the Western community (both of them are members of NATO, UN, CSCE, BSEC and Turkey has a Customs Union with EU of which Greece is a member) became two hostile brothers of the Aegean

Sea. Moreover, this hostility emerging from previously argued international disputes institutionalized by both of countries through media and education³.

The Cyprus issue has always been considered as an important problem by Turkish scholars.⁴ However, in addition to conventional attitude about consistency and coherence of Turkish foreign policy towards the issue; it has been *per se* accepted that Turkish public opinion is a harmonious supporter of policy pursued by different governments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. Coherence and consistency of policies pursued is a matter of a more detailed discussion, however, despite its journalistic style, works of Mehmet Ali Birand give good examples of inconsistency of policies of different governments⁵ About the support of Turkish public opinion, it is not possible to make a detailed discussion since survey research data is not available. This scarcity of data may be a result of two possible facts: a) there is no such a field work about public opinion attitudes towards the Cyprus issue or b) there is no publication on this issue. Whatever the reason is, it is not easy to compare findings of this paper with findings of other scholars. Consequently, the reader has to consider the fact that difficulty of comparing findings *per se* brings problem of external validity of arguments of this paper.

Chronology of Events⁶

In January 5th Southern Cypriot Foreign Minister Alecos Michaelides confirmed that S. Cyprus signed a contract with the Russian Rosvooruzheniye company for the acquisition of an air defense system composed of S-300 surface-to-air missiles. S. Cyprus government stated that they had no choice but to proceed to equip Cyprus with an air-defense system by arguing that “[t]he acquisition of an air defense system by a small country such as Cyprus in order to defend itself, is in full compliance with international law and the "inherent right to self-defense".

Ankara reacted strongly to the announcement that Cyprus will acquire Russian S-300 missiles. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ömer Akbel stated that Turkey firmly opposes a change of the existing military balance in Cyprus and said that "Turkey will take all the necessary action" if the situation on Cyprus continues to deteriorate. Turkish Defense Ministry also denounced the Cypriot-Russian agreement and argued that "Turkey is ready to fulfill all its obligations in Cyprus".

On his part, Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos, responding to Turkish threats against Cyprus stated that "Greece is ready to assist and defend Cyprus". He declared that the Greek response to any aggressive action by Ankara in the Aegean or in Cyprus would elicit an instant military response by Greece, a "response that will surprise many people," he concluded.

In Washington, State Department Spokesman, Nicholas Burns, strongly criticized the Cyprus governments decision to acquire Russian S-300 missiles. Burns stated that the "Cypriot decision introduces a new and destabilizing military element on the island and in the region.....The action of the Cyprus government is a step down to the wrong path." Also at the State Department, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs John Kornblum met Cyprus' Ambassador to Washington Andros Nikolaidis and expressed displeasure for the military agreement with Russia It was also announced in Washington, that a senior US diplomat, Carey Cavanaugh, will be visiting Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in the next few days in order to advance a Cyprus initiative.

As a response to this international discontent S. Cypriot Foreign Minister Michaelides stated in a BBC interview that "nothing we bought or buy is for attacking anyone. It is purely for defense". Greek government also supported S. Cypriot government by emphasizing on the same issue, the right of self defense". Moreover, Defense Minister

Akis Tzohatsopoulos warned Turkey that any military action in Cyprus or the Aegean will elicit instant Greek military response.

In Turkey, in the meantime, Defense Minister Turban Tayan stated that "...in 1974, we did what we had to do. We will do the same. We will attack if necessary." Turkey will use all its means to halt the missile deployment, the Turkish Defense Minister declared.

: The crisis that erupted over Cyprus's decision to acquire the S-300 Russian surface-to-air missiles for self defense receded, at least temporarily, following a visit to the region by Carey Cavanaugh, head of the Southeastern European section of the State Department. First Cavanaugh visited Nicosia (January 12-13) where he met with President Glavcos Clerides and secured a commitment by the Cyprus government that the Russian air defense system would not be deployed for sixteen months. Following his meeting with Clerides, the US diplomat went to Northern Cyprus and met with Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and discussed the missile question along with proposals for military disengagement along the "Green Line" separating free from occupied Cyprus.

The next stop of the US diplomat was Athens (January 13-14) where he held talks on the missiles issue with the Director General of the Greek Foreign Ministry. The last stop of Cavanaugh's visit was Ankara (January 15-16) where he held talks with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials as well as military leaders. Following his discussions in Ankara, the American diplomat strongly criticized the Cyprus government for its decision to acquire Russian S-300 air defense missiles and also expressed opposition to Turkey's belligerent reaction.

Cavanaugh also seemed to be confident that the missiles will never arrive in Cyprus. "It is my personal expectation that those missiles will never come to the island of Cyprus," he stated.

Visit of three Turkish warships to Famagusta has been followed by a Joint Declaration signed in Ankara (January 20) between Turkey's President Süleyman Demirel and president Rauf Denktaş. This Joint declaration included cooperation against changing military balance in the island, economic and political cooperation. After this declaration, S-300 missiles crisis reached to an end until mid-September 1997.

Political Environment of Turkey in 1990s.

First important and dominant characteristic of the Turkish political system is its high degree of fragmentation both at the level of electorate and political parties. It is widely accepted that, one of main reasons of the chaotic political environment of pre-1980s was the fragmented level of political system (Sunar and Sayarı:1986). This argument was also accepted by the generals and they put some constitutional and legal constraints to the political life in order to prevent such a fragmentation. However, after 1987, the indirect liberalization of the political life as a consequence of abolishment of restrictions of political activities of leaders of pre-1980 period, political system of Turkey begin to be fragmented.

According to Çarkoğlu (1997), fragmentation of the party system increased both measured in terms of fractionalization and "effective number of parties" indices. Fractionalization index of Turkish party increased to 79 in 1995 from 74 in 1991 and 64 in 1983. Moreover, fractionalization does not limited with increasing but also diversified and homogenized in terms of geographical regions. Furthermore, effective number of parties increased to 6 in 1995 from 3 in 1983 (ibid.:8).

In addition to fractionalization, volatility of Turkish electorate increased. Çarkoğlu states that volatility of the Turkish party system reached to its peak point in 1987 elections. Despite relative decrease in 1991 and 1995 elections, average volatility of Turkish party system is much higher than averages of Western democracies (ibid.:4). Increased fragmentation and volatility is not limited with Turkish electorate. Political parties are also fragmented and volatile. Çarkoğlu, in his work in which he uses party manifestoes to measure fragmentation and volatility, argues that this volatility and fragmentation are also visible in party agendas, in other words, positions of political parties in some issues. A closer analysis of internal consistency of election manifestoes of political parties shows that while the highest issue profile consistency is obtained by the Motherland Party, the Welfare Party has consistently lowered its consistency election to election. Since the True Path Party and the Democratic Left Party are also political actors which shifted their focuses relatively rapidly. Only the Motherland Party and the Republican People's Party have consistently emphasized on similar issues (ibid.:20). This situation is a clear indicator of rapid change experienced by the Turkish Party system.

Another exciting finding of Çarkoğlu's analysis is the chaotic situation of political parties' differentiations. While relative positions of political parties was exposing a relatively stable picture until 1995 elections, by this elections "several parties leap-frog each other's position". "The Democratic Left Party shifts to the right by emphasising particularly freedom and human rights, economic orthodoxy through savings and thrift, and smaller and more efficient government. The True Path Party's move to the left is characterised by emphasis on internationalist, pro-European community, democracy, pro-social services and pro-education arguments. On the other hand, the Motherland Party moved further down to the right end of the spectrum

by emphasising freedom and human rights, economic orthodoxy through smaller and more efficient government, traditional morality and national way of life. The Welfare Party moves back down and maintains the leadership of the right end of the spectrum” (ibid.:17)

According to Ergüder, reasons of this fragmentation are a) constant tinkering with electoral system that never allows to sustain two subsequent elections with same rules, b) military interventions prevented institutionalization of political parties and c) rapid mobilization and population growth resulted on bursting of the party system (Ergüder, 1995:71).

According to Kalaycıoğlu (1994), rapid change experienced by the party system is simultaneous with the dissolvment of the center. “No single party emerges to stand for the ‘values and interests’ of the center or receives the kind of electoral support that the RPP had received in the past. The vote is so fragmented that no apparent leading party of the peripheral groups exists either.... Turkey lacks a coherent and compact elite group occupying the center and defending the collective interests of the center. The elites of the center differ in their level of commitment to ‘the image of the Good society’ which the Kemalist cultural revolution of the 1920s and 1930s had created” (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994:407).

Another important characteristic of the Turkish party system in 1980s and 1990s is the rapid rise of the Welfare Party. In 1994, the Welfare Party that is the successor of the NSP of pre-1980 democracy could able to win 327 municipalities. What suprising is the success of the WP in greater municipalities: the WP won 6 of 15 greater municipalities including Istanbul and Ankara (Tuncer, 1994:9). In 1995 elections, the WP got 21% of total votes and 155 seats in the parliament. Today, the WP is the greatest political party and major party of the coalition government. After the rise of

the WP, some of students of political science tried to understand and explain reasons of this rise. According to Güralp, the emergence of Islamic radicalism can best be understood in the global context of the crisis of statism and of inwardly oriented industrialization, in other words, the failure of nationalist-statist developmentalism. With the era of rapid transition to the market economy in 1980s, the competitive individualist ideologies expand and dominated the cultural realm. Thus, the failure of state-centered nationalism found expression in the growth of an ideological commitment to religion, local community and ethnicity (Güralp, 1992:21-23).

According to Ayata and Salt, the rise of political Islam was a result of neoliberal policies of the MP during 1980s. After a decade of neoliberal economic policies, Turkey is face to face a serious problem of income inequality that sharpened the gap between the center and the periphery. Discours of the WP and other Islamic organizations that emphasize on equality, social security, welfare and social justice attracted a part of discontent masses (Ayata, 1996:55 and Salt, 1995:25).

Sakallıoğlu states that “the perceiving the re-emergence of Islam over the past decade as a result of the bankruptcy of the Kemalist modernization project oversimplifies the relationship of Islam to the state” (Sakallıoğlu, 1996:231). According to Sakallıoğlu, during 1980s, national capitalisms entered into a crisis as result of international convergence of neoclassical development and economic liberalism, spurred by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the global code words of the new era –market economy and individualism- negated the old forms of bureaucratic domination and state-society linkage in Turkey:

“Tensions produced by liberalizing the economy aggravated the growing influence of ethnic and Islamic social and political forces. These forces challenged the modernization formula of the old national capitalist state and insisted on a new social

consensus, based on more cultural than cultural differences. Thus, in the emerging state-society relationship, the state had to establish its legitimacy on a new basis rooted less in the insularity of the secular-modernist project and more willing to incorporate the most important marker of the social identity, Islam, into the official discourse”(ibid.:45)

According to Sakallıoğlu, the MP mobilized Turkey’s traditionally conservative constituencies and some Islamic platforms around the cause of economic liberalism, integrating them with the existing order in the process (ibid.:47).

Keyman argues that the rise of Islamic “identity” is not simply a “revival” of an essential and coherent identity which, although being marginalized by Kemalist nationalism, was always and already operative in civil society. “Rather, Islam appeared to be one of the articulating elements of difference by which to construct an alternative subjectivity to the unifying vision of national identity, in an historical context where the depolitization of social relations and the reorganization of political life in a non-participatory mode unintentionally created the possibility of thinking of political community outside the terrain of Kemalist nationalism” (Keyman, 1995:14).

These two important development of 1990s, the rise of the Welfare Party and increasing level of political fragmentation significantly effected inter-party competition in Turkey. First of all, the rise of the Welfare Party created a new dimension in politics, the dimension of secularism. Since political islam has usually been accepted synonymous with anti-secularism, the Welfare Party has been admitted as the most important representative of anti-secular segments of the society⁷. Political developments of last one year, decisions of National Security Committee of February 28th, fall of the coalition government of the Welfare Party and the True Path Party, and societal reactions to Law about the extension of the primary education are good

examples of significance of newly emerged political dimension. This dimension pushed center and center-left parties to compete within a very limited issue space. First of all, all of them had to compete against the Welfare Party. Secondly, they had to compete with each other on a very limited number of issues. Since they have defined themselves as “different than the Welfare Party”, there have been problems of differentiation of these political parties, different than the Welfare Party. Consequently, these two factors, limitation of the competition space and fragmentation led to overemphasize on a limited number of issues such as the Customs Union, corruption as tools of differentiation. Political campaigns of 1995 general elections are good examples of this problematic nature of inter-party competition⁸.

In addition to previously argued factor of problem of differentiation, Turkish party system is face to face a problem of renovation. Since the death of Turgut Özal (1993), leaders of all political parties except Ecevit of the DLP and Erbakan of the WP have replaced by new politicians even that the RPP leadership changed three times. This rapid renovation of leadership cadres is coupled with two important political development: death of Türkeş, the charismatic leader of the ultra-nationalist National Action Party and case against the Welfare Party that may lead closing down of this political party. Since nationalist cadres of the NAP are not successful in replacing Türkeş, this failure created a great vacuum in the nationalist right. This vacuum creates a significant opportunity space of other political parties. Furthermore, a possible amendment of the Welfare Party creates another vacuum in the religious right. It is argued that failure of the Welfare Party in integrating themselves created two-sided disillusion: the Welfare Party failed to satisfy its traditional voters that hope to realize their protracted demands from the political system such as radical

changes, and it did not succeed in fulfilling expectations of new supporters of the Party. Thus, a possible amendment of the Welfare Party may easily lead to dissolution of cadres of the Party and this dissolution may create the second opportunity space for other political parties⁹.

To summarize, it is possible to say that Turkish political environment presents a picture that gives good opportunities to politicize a given issue. Party system is fragmented and volatile both at the electorate and agenda levels, the rise of the Welfare Party limits the competition space and makes inter-party differences even negligible, renovation of leadership cadres, death of Türkeş and a potential banning of the Welfare party presents significant opportunities of other political parties. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that politicians are most tended to use any issue, international or not to increase their votes by consolidating their constituencies or differentiating themselves from other political parties.

The significant question is here, whether Turkish politicians have employed S-300 missiles crises in order to increase their votes or not. In order to answer this question a two-step analysis will be made. First, positions of politicians and political parties in this issue will be discussed and secondly results of a survey research will be presented.

Politicians and the Crisis

First contribution of Turkish politicians to the crisis came from Minister of Defense of time, Turhan Tayan from the True Path Party. In his declaration, Tayan stated “in 1974, we did what we had to do. We will do the same. We will attack if necessary”. Tayan said that Turkey would make what it can in order to prevent transportation of S-300 missiles to S. Cyprus by not allowing passage of ships that transports these

missiles and closing down its air space in the case of attempting to transports by airplanes (Milliyet, Akşam, Sabah, January 10, 1996).

However, reactions of Turkish government did not remain limited with declaration of Tayan. Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the True Path Party, Çiller stated that “these offensive missiles will not be placed to the south of the Island or not. (Bu saldırgan silahlar Kıbrıs'ın güneyine ya konmayacak, ya konmayacak). If not, Turkey will make what is necessary, including attacking to Cyprus”. Çiller who stated that Turkey can not become indifferent to “aggressive politics” of S. Cyprus, said that similar policies pursued by S. Cyprus in the past did not bring nothing than “tears and fears” to Southern cypriot people (Sabah, January 11; 1997).

In January 15, prime minister and leader of the Welfare Party, Erbakan joint these two “hawks”: “Greeks know us well”. In his speech in the parliament, Erbakan stated that “Turkish army is the strongest army in the world... In this situation making islands flammable is a big mistake. Now, our chief commander is in the Island. And we hope that Greece and S. Cyprus leave these intolarable provocations, and become wiser. Because, Greeks know our nation well. They have experience in this issue. In 1992 and 1974, they had observed results of their attempts. We hope that the history will not be repeated” (Hürriyet, January, Akşam 15, 1997).

In January 22, Erbakan said that Turkey will leave pacifist pattern of behavior that did not resulted on else than increased intolerable provocations of Greece and S. Cyprus and stated that “now, this stability will be presented” (Hürriyet, January 22, 1997).

Another leading politician of the Welfare Party, Gül stated that "Turkey declared his rigidity similar to 1974. Prime minister Erbakan communicated this attitude of Ankara to necessary places. It has to be known that, if missiles will be settled on the island, we will shoot them” (Milliyet, January 15, 1997).

In addition to these politicians, only Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party made a statement about the crisis. According to Ecevit, armament of S. Cyprus aims to squeeze Turkey rather than attacking Turkey or Northern Cyprus. Ecevit said that “increasing armament of S. Cyprus would result on confusion of Turkey, and Turkish government would reflect this confusion through threatening declarations. Then, some so-called friends would interfere and say “withdraw your army from Cyprus, your objection to the membership of S. Cyprus to European Community, we enforce them to stop armament”. They have already avowed this scenario. Our government would be proud of these so-called attempts of our “friends” and say that “we have been successful in our hard reactions. I hope that our government will not be deceived to this scenario" (Milliyet, January 11, 1997).

Except these three political parties, positions of other political parties are not clearly observable in Turkish press. Thus, our analysis will be extended to meetings of parliament. In January 14, 1997, Turkish Grand National Assembly met in order to discuss the crisis¹⁰.

Defense Minister Tayan, who talked as the representative of the government, related the last crisis to the newly emerged “defense doctrine” of Greece and S. Cyprus. According to Tayan, the major aim of this doctrine was to surround Turkey by the south and the west. Moreover, this joint defense doctrine would be followed by the membership of S. Cyprus to European Union and indirect realization of the ENOSIS. Tayan said that last attempts of S. Cyprus to purchase S-300 missiles was an important threat to the peace since it was radically changing balance of power in the island. Since Turkey has geostrategic interests in the region and commitments to Turkish Cypriot people, it would take every measure to prevent any attempt to shake security of Turkish Cypriots.

In this meeting of the parliament, the Motherland Party has been represented by Akarcalı. Akarcalı argued that developments in Cyprus became to a threatening level for Turkey and previous governments that did not respond previous attempts of Greece and S. Cyprus were responsables of this situation. He argued that despite existence of a weak and inconsistent government, the nation and the parliament would respond such attempts as a whole. United States and European Union had major responsibilities in solving this crisis and they had to fulfill these responsibilities. Finally, Akarcalı concluded that “if some do not take lessons from the history, they have to accept pains which will be stemmed from repetition of the history”.

The True Path Party has been represented by ex-chief commander Güreş. According to Güreş, the major aim of S. Cyprus was to realize ENOSIS by attacking to North when it is possible. These missiles were defensive weapons however with a small modification, it was possible to use them as offensive weapons. Thus, purchase of these missiles had to be prevented by using every measures.

Emmioğlu who has represented the Welfare Party, made a short speech whose major theme was that they were supporting policies of the government and declarations of prime minister, ministers of defense and foreign affairs were to sustain peace rather than making provocation.

The Republican People Party has been represented by Öymen. Öymen argued that last manoeuvres of Greece and S. Cyprus to increase their military capacity might have two different objective: to threat Turkey directly, or use this military capacity as a bargaining tool. According to Öymen, whatever the reason was, Greece would be unsuccessful since it neglects the stable attitude of Turkey. He argued that they were criticizer of the government. Nevertheless, when an external threat occurs, they would

unite and defend the country as a whole. However, first requisite of this unity was to form a national policy by incorporating every political party and by informing them.

Ex-prime minister Ecevit made a speech as the representative of the Democratic Left Party. According to Ecevit, last manoeuvres of Southern Cyprus was a result of existence of a favorable environment. Since European Union and Russia gave their supports to S. Cyprus, they had the opportunity to squeeze Turkey and N. Cyprus, first by recessing dialogues and secondly by increasing their military power. Ecevit criticized declarations of “some” ministers of government and said that “if necessary, Turkey will intervene to the island. However, it intervenes without declaring with ‘davul-zurna’”. He repeated his arguments that these manoeuvres were parts of a scenario that aimed to enforce Turkey to compromise about the Cyprus issue.

This review of declarations of politicians about the crisis and the Cyprus issue in general presents some important findings. First of all, it is possible to say that partners of the coalition government presented the most “hawkish” attitudes towards the issue. Especially, speakers of the True Path Party took the most aggressive position in this issue. The major partner of the government, the Welfare Party has also exposed a “hawkish” role, however it did not stress its position too much. Moreover, to compare their arguments that Cyprus had to be annexed during their “opposition” years, it is possible to argue that their new position was relatively liberal. Another strong reaction to and emphasis on the crisis came from the Democratic Left Party. Since Ecevit is synonymous with 1974 military intervention and his nationalist leftist position is well-known, his “hawkish” position is not surprising. However, declarations of Ecevit did not lack a strong criticism against policies pursued by the government, including speeches of government members and diplomatic inefficiency of the government. Two major opposition parties, the Motherland Party and the

Republican People Party criticized the government, accused Southern Cypriots and Greeks and argued that they will defend the country as a whole. However, they did not put their positions in this issue and preferred to voice the sound of silence.

Given this situation, it is possible to say that the True Path Party preferred to use the issue in order to emphasize on its nationalistic nature and differentiate itself from its political rivals, especially from the Motherland Party. The Democratic Left Party emphasized on this issue, since it admits the Cyprus issue as a part of charisma of its leader, Ecevit. The Welfare Party continued its radical position, even liberalized it. The Motherland Party and the Republican Party did not prefer to use this issue. As a conclusion of this part, it is possible to argue that the S-300 crisis has been politicized, in other words employed by if not all of, but a part of politicians to increase their votes. In the following part of the paper, this hypothesis will be tested by using survey research data.

Findings of Survey Research

The survey, conducted by İMV-SAM, in İstanbul on September 15-25, 1997, employed face-to-face interviewing in household environments. Eight hundred interviews were planned. Households were located in a systematically sampled set of 50 quarters (out of İstanbul's total of 591 quarters), and eight interviews were targeted in each of the two streets per quarter. Upon completion of field work, data were weighted to adjust to location and population quotas, and to avoid problems of grouping. Evaluation was based on 817 interviews. The margin of error is calculated at ± 3 percent at a confidence level of 95 percent.

Two main questions are asked to respondents. First of these questions is “what is the best solution to the Cyprus Problem” and frequency distribution of answers is as follows:

Table 1. Best solution to the Cyprus problem

Answer	Cases	%	Cumulative
Keeping the status quo	52	6.5	6.5
Federation with two regions	78	9.8	16.3
Two different states	135	16.9	33.2
Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey	308	38.5	71.6
Older Status of Cyprus	133	16.6	88.2
No idea	94	11.8	100.0
NR	16	Missing	
	817	100.0	

Analysis of this table shows that despite lack of unity about best solution to the Cyprus problem, most favored solution is the annexation of Northern Cyprus to Turkey with a percentage of 38 per cent. Second and third alternatives are existence of two different states and older status of Cyprus with about 17 per cent. Sum of two alternatives that may be labelled as “no-solution”, annexation and two different states is about 55.4 per cent, meaning that majority of respondents favor no-solution. Sum of more integrative solutions, such as older status of Cyprus and federation with two regions is about 25.4 per cent. These numbers shows that Turkish public opinion is far being homogenous about the best solution to the Cyprus issue since two opposite alternatives are powerful enough. Closer analysis of these answers according to some demographic variables and party affiliation gives important clues about the nature of the problem.

Table 2. Best solution to the Cyprus problem and Gender*

	Male	Female	Total
Keeping the status quo	7.4	7.5	7.4
Federation with two regions	11.7	10.4	11.1
Two separate states	20.6	17.4	19.2
Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey	40.3	47.4	43.7
Older Status of Cyprus	20.1	17.4	18.8
No idea	6.3	17.3	11.8
N=801			
Cramer's V: 0.07			

*percentages are calculated without considering “no idea” answers

Most striking finding of table 2 is the significant difference between “no idea answers”. While this percentage is 6.3 per cent for male respondents, it increases to 17.3 per cent for female respondents. Reasons of this difference are several including “less politicization of women” and “privacy of female respondents”. However, testing these hypotheses is beyond the scope of this paper. Second important findings, is the significant difference between males and females. Percentage of annexation alternative is much more higher in females than males (47.4 per cent vs. 40.4 per cent). Opposingly, answers of “two separate states” and “older status” alternatives are higher in male respondents than females. However, overall effect of gender to attitudes in the Cyprus issue measured by Cramer’s V coefficient is small but significant: 0.07.

Table 3. Best solution to the Cyprus problem and Education*

	No Education	Primary	Secondary	Lycee	University	Higher
Keeping the status quo	0.0	6.8	6.0	8.5	13.4	0.0
Federation with two regions	3.8	6.5	11.9	13.6	20.9	62.5
Two separate states	11.5	17.3	14.3	22.6	28.4	25.0
Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey	73.1	58.3	40.5	26.6	17.9	0.0
Older Status of Cyprus	11.5	11.1	27.4	28.6	19.4	12.5
No idea	23.1	18.2	14.3	8.0	1.5	0.0
N=800	N=33	N= 382	N=96	N= 215	N= 65	N= 8
Cramer’s V: 0.20						

*percentages are calculated without considering “no idea” answers

Table 3. in which the relationship between education and answers to our question is analyzed shows that there is a significant negative relationship between education and “no idea” answers. Percentage of “no idea” answers decreased to 1.5 per cent in university graduates from 23.1 per cent in uneducated respondents. This finding implicitly verifies hypothesis that more educated people have more interest in foreign policy issues. Similar a negative relationship exists between “annexation” alternative and education. More educated respondents less favor annexation of N. Cyprus to

Turkey as a solution to the Cyprus issue. Federation, two separate states and older status of the island are most favored alternatives by more educated respondents. Although that Cramer's V coefficient is small, this analysis of table 3 gives us some important clues about the relationship between education and foreign policies attitudes.

Table 4. Best solution to the Cyprus problem and Socioeconomic Status*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Keeping the status quo	5.7	6.7	6.2	7.0	8.2	12.2	20.8
Federation with two regions	5.7	7.5	11.4	19.8	8.2	17.1	20.8
Two separate states	14.3	15.7	18.1	22.1	24.6	29.3	29.2
Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey	62.9	54.9	41.5	31.4	29.5	26.8	16.7
Older Status of Cyprus	11.4	15.3	22.8	19.8	29.5	14.6	12.5
No idea	14.3	16.4	10.9	8.1	21.3	4.9	4.2
N=800	40	312	214	93	74	44	24
Cramer's V: 0.15							

*percentages are calculated without considering "no idea" answers

In Table 4, the relationship between attitudes towards the Cyprus issue and socioeconomic status which is calculated by considering income, and ownership of some furniture such as TV, video, pc and measured at 7 level, is presented. This table indicates that relationship between socioeconomic status and "no idea" answers is not clear. Thus it is not possible to say that socioeconomic status effected positively or negatively interest in foreign affairs. However, there are some significant patterns of attitudes. First of all, annexation alternative is much more favored by respondents with lower socioeconomic status. Percentage of "annexation" answers is 62.9 per cent in first level of socioeconomic status, this ratio decreases to 16.7 per cent in the highest level. Also, "keeping the status quo", "two separate states" and "federation" alternatives are much more preferred by respondents with higher level of socioeconomic status.

Table 5. Best solution to the Cyprus problem and Party preference*

	MP	RPP	DLP	TPP	PDP	NAP	DFP	WP
Keeping the status quo	11.7	12.9	0.0	7.0	0.0	4.2	0.0	3.9
Federation with two regions	10.8	16.1	10.1	9.3	0.0	4.2	28.6	5.8
Two separate states	25.2	29.0	25.8	4.7	9.1	8.3	0.0	15.5
Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey	41.4	22.6	41.6	69.8	27.3	54.2	7.1	66.0
Older Status of Cyprus	10.8	19.4	22.5	9.3	63.6	29.2	64.3	8.7
No idea	9.0	9.8	15.2	9.6	19.5	16.6	10.8	9.2
N=800	121	69	105	46	14	27	15	113

Cramer's V: 0.25

*percentages are calculated without considering "no idea" answers

Table 5 presents relationship between party preference and attitudes towards the Cyprus issue. Most existing but not significant (because of low number of cases) finding of the table is the relationship between "no idea" answers and minor party preferences. Table 5 shows that "no idea" answers are high among supporters of the National Action Party, the People's Democracy Party, and the Democracy and Freedom Party. Only major party whose ratio of "no idea" answers is high, is the Democratic Left Party. Another striking findings is differences between choices. First of all, "annexation" alternative is most preferred by respondents from the True Path Party (69.8 per cent), the Welfare Party (66 per cent) and the National Action Party (54.2 per cent). Two separate states alternative is most preferred by the voters for the Motherland Party (25.2 per cent), the Republican People's Party (29 per cent) and the Democratic Left Party (25.8 per cent). Older status alternative is highly preferred by leftist parties: the Republican People's Party (19.4 per cent), the Democratic Left Party (22.5 per cent), the People's Democracy Party (63.9 per cent) and the Freedom and Democracy Party (64.3 per cent). Another striking difference is between attitudes of the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Left Party: ratio of supporters of annexation is 22.6 per cent in the Republican People's Party while this number is 41.6 per cent for the Democratic Left Party. It is possible to argue that this difference is a result of nationalistic "myth" of Ecevit as it is discussed above. Cramer's V coefficient is small but higher than other coefficients.

Second main question is about “how to deal with S-300 missiles problem”. Answers are below:

Table 6. How to deal with S300 missiles

Answer	Cases	%	Cumulative
Ignore them	70	8.9	8.9
Destroy them	125	16.0	25.0
Prevent them through diplomacy	466	59.7	84.7
No idea	120	15.3	100.0
NR	36	Missing	
	817	100.0	

Table 6 shows that the majority of respondent favor diplomatic ways in order to prevent location of S-300 missiles. A quarter of respondents think that destroying them is a the best alternative. Despite that this table shows that Turkish public opinion about S-300 crisis is homogenous and favor peaceful ways, a closer analysis of findings raises important questions.

Table 7. How to deal with S-300 missiles and Gender*

	Male	Female
Ignore them	11.7	9.3
Destroy them	27.8	8.3
Prevent them through diplomacy	60.6	82.4
No idea	7.3	23.3
N=781	N=389	N=392
Cramer's V: 0.26		

**percentages are calculated without considering “no idea” answers*

Table 7 above indicates two important findings: first of all, similar to attitudes about theCyprus issue, “no idea” answers are much more high in female respondents than males. Moreover, it is possible to say that females are more tended to solving the crisis through diplomatic negotiations with a ratio of 82.4 per cent vs. 60.6 per cent of males.

Table 8. How to deal with S-300 missiles and Education*

	No Education	Primary	Secondary	Lycee	University	Higher
Ignore them	0.0	11.6	11.3	8.8	10.9	25.0
Destroy them	5.6	21.9	25.0	16.6	9.4	0.0
Prevent them through diplomacy	94.4	66.6	63.8	74.6	79.7	75.0
No idea	44.0	19.2	14.1	7.6		47.2
N=780	N=33	N= 374	N=93	N= 208	N= 64	N= 8
Cramer's V: 0.11						

* *percentages are calculated without considering "no idea" answers*

In table 8, relationship between education and attitudes towards S-300 crisis is presented. According to this table, there is a significant negative relationship between education and "no idea" answers with the exception of higher than university education category that may stem from low number of cases in this category. First of all, if column of uneducated will be neglected, it is possible to say that there is a significant relationship between education and preferred alternatives. Ratio of "destroy them" alternatives to column totals decreases to 9.4 per cent in university graduates from 21.9 per cent in primary school and 25 per cent in secondary school graduates. Similarly, "prevent them through diplomacy" increases to 79.7 per cent in university graduates from 66.6 and 63.8 per cent in primary and secondary school graduates. Thus it is possible to argue that more educated are more tended to solve the crisis through diplomatic ways.

Table 9. How to deal with S-300 missiles and Socioeconomic Status*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Ignore them	20.0	9.0	9.2	19.3	6.6	11.9	0.0
Destroy them	26.7	18.4	24.7	15.7	18.0	7.1	4.3
Prevent them through diplomacy	53.3	72.7	66.1	65.1	75.4	81.0	95.7
No idea	24.9	19.3	14.2	9.9	13.9	4.8	4.4
N=800	40	304	204	93	71	44	24
Cramer's V: 0.14							

* *percentages are calculated without considering "no idea" answers*

Table 8 shows that there is a relationship between “no idea” answers and socioeconomic status. Percentages of “no idea” answers to column totals decrease to 4.4 per cent in the highest socioeconomic level from 24.9 per cent in the lowest level. Similarly, alternative of “destroying them” decreases to 4.3 per cent from 26.7 per cent. As a consequence, number of respondents who favored diplomatic ways increases with increasing level of socioeconomic status. While percentage of respondents who favored diplomatic ways 53.7 per cent in the lowest level, this ratio increases to 95.7 at the highest level.

Table 10. How to deal with S-300 missiles and Party preference*

	MP	RPP	DLP	TPP	PDP	NAP	FDP	WP
Ignore them	15.8	10.8	11.8	7.9	8.3	9.5	15.4	8.2
Destroy them	15.8	6.2	16.5	28.9	0.0	47.6	0.0	24.5
Prevent them through diplomacy	68.3	83.1	71.8	63.2	91.7	42.9	84.6	67.3
No idea	15.7	7.1	16.5	16.1	12.6	23.4		13.3
N=800	120	70	102	46	14	27	15	113
Cramer's V: 0.19								

*percentages are calculated without considering “no idea” answers

Similar to findings of Table 5, most radical way of action, “destroying missiles” is favored by same parties: the True Path Party (28.9 per cent), the National Action Party (47.6 per cent) and the Welfare Party (24.5 per cent). Opposingly, diplomatic way of action is preferred by respondents from the Republican People’s Party (83.1), the Democratic Left Party (71.8 per cent), the People’s Democracy Party (91.7 per cent), the Freedom and Democracy Party (84.6 per cent). Ignorance is a valid option only for respondents from the Motherland Party (15.8 per cent) and the Freedom and Democracy Party (15.4 per cent).

This analyses of findings of survey research show some important points. First of all, attitudes of Turkish public opinion towards the Cyprus issue in general and S300 missiles crises are not homogenous and some demographic variables crosscut public attitudes. Annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey as a solution to the Cyprus issue is most

preferred by women, respondents with lesser educated and lesser socioeconomic status. Similarly, federation with two regions and two separate states are preferred by respondents with higher level of education and socioeconomic status. In the case of S-300 missiles crisis, although that “preventing them through diplomatic negotiations” is generally agreed upon, there are some differences dependent to education and socioeconomic status. Respondents with higher education and socioeconomic status prefer diplomatic negotiations while “destroying them” is most preferred by lesser educated and lower socioeconomic status. Moreover, women tends to support diplomatic ways of preventing settlement of these missiles.

In addition to these demographic factors, party preferences play an important role in shaping attitudes towards these international issues. Following analyses above, it is possible to argue that Turkish public opinion may be divided into two different parts, with generic labels of “hawks” and “doves”. Majority of “hawks” are people from the True Path Party, the Nationalist Action Party and the Welfare Party. “Doves” are composed of the Republican People Party, the Freedom and Democracy Party and the People’s Democracy Party. It is possible to add up the Democratic Left Party, despite some nationalistic emphasis of his supporters. Among these political parties, only voters of the Motherland Party does not present a significant pattern of behavior. This may be an evidence of the central position of the Motherland Party.

Here, the critical question is whether party preferences are better predictor of attitudes towards international issues than other factors. By using two types of evidence, we can answer this question positively. First of all, there is a significant correspondence between respondents’ positions and positions of their preferred political parties that is discussed above. It is argued that most nationalistic and aggressive position has been taken by the True Path Party. Analyses of survey research results showed that

supporters of the True Path Party are among most “hawkish” people. Similarly, respondents from the Welfare Party are also “hawkish” similar to position of their political parties. Moreover, supporter of the Democratic Left Party which is argued that his nationalistic position is a result of his charismatic leadership are among hawkish people that supports annexation of N. Cyprus to Turkey. Secondly, a comparison of Cramer’s V coefficients shows that among these significant coefficients, coefficients of tables 5 and 9 are highest. Despite limited power of explanation, these similarities provide good evidence for our arguments that the Cyprus issue has been politicized, used by politicians especially by Çiller and Erbakan in order to maximize their votes.

Conclusion and Further Research

It is so far argued that the major aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the domestic and the international. In the theoretical part of the paper, the author tried to make a definition of politicization by referring some other works. This concept has been largely defined as “use of an international issue by politicians in order to maximize their votes”. Works of the rational choice school allowed to evaluate a theory of politicization to be summarized that politicization occur when a society is fragmented, political parties ideologically fragmented or some of these political parties employed this issue in order to maximize their benefits by differentiating themselves.

In the empirical part of the paper, it is exposed that political environment of Turkey has been characterized with higher level of political fragmentation and intense political competition. Such a political environment is very suitable for politicization of any international issue. Short review of declarations of politicians did not falsify these expectations and showed that two partners of the coalition government of time have largely employed this issue in order to emphasize on their nationalistic attributes.

Results from the field work did not falsify these arguments. First of all, results exposed that despite general expectations there are important incoherence among Turkish public opinion about both of the Cyprus issue and missile crisis. Furthermore, this variation is related with some demographic characteristics such as education, gender and socioeconomic status. Moreover, there is a significant relationship between positions of political parties and attitudes of supporters of these parties.

Nevertheless, these findings are not sufficient to evaluate a “grand theory” of attitudes of Turkish public opinion. First of all, scarcity of this kind of works limits external validity of arguments of this paper. Since our findings are replicable, we are face to face with the problem of external validity. A second problem stems from the structure of data. Since the survey is not specifically designed to test our hypotheses, data analysis became difficult and we had to employ some “out-dated” methods because of measurement level of variables. This inspecificity of the survey also led to problem of testing interactions of our independent variables and prevented tests of spuriousity.

However, some findings of the research are very clear. First of all, Turkish public opinion about the Cyprus issue is far from being homogenous or united. There is important dissensus about solution to this crisis. This dissensus creates an important avenue for students of political sciences. Secondly, contrary to general expectations, the Cyprus issue is highly politicized. This higher level of politicization may result on suboptimal outcomes for both of Turks and Greeks. Consequently, students of political sciences have to be very careful about this politicization.

¹ See, **Grindle Merilee -John Thomas, Public Choices and Policy Change**, (John Hopkins University Press, Maryland 1991) for a more detailed discussion.

² For political preferences of George Bush during the Cold War, see, Gearoid O Tuathai, “The Effacement of Place? US Foreign Policy and the Spatiality of the Gulf Crisis”, **Antipode** 25 (1), January 1993; Noam Chomsky; “The Gulf Crisis”, **Z Magazine**, February 1991; John Zaller; **Strategic Politicians, Public Opinion, and the Gulf Crisis**, Center for American Politics and Public Policy Occasional Paper Series (93-1). For Necmettin Erbakan and his visit to Libya, see Sami Kohen, “Çok yönlü mü, çok başlı mı?”, **Milliyet**, October 4th, 1996; Şahin Alpay, “Dış Politikada Arayış”, **Milliyet**, October 10th, 1996.

³ For good examples of this institutionalization see Herkül Milas, **Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Bir Önsöz**, (Kavram:İstanbul 1989), pp:32-48 and Volkan and Itzkowitz, pp.167-171. Another good examples of this effort, see various issues of **Balkan Neighbours**, (Access Association, Sofia)

⁴ For more detailed information about the Cyprus issue, see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Troubled Waters: Cyprus and Turkish Foreign Policy”, paper presented in December 1997, SİSAV, **Kıbrıs Sorunu: Gelişmeler ve Görüşler**, (SİSAV, İstanbul 1990), Mehmet Arif Demirer, **Türk’ün Onur Sorunu: Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti**, (Turhan, Ankara, 1993); Mehmet Gönübol et. al. **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası**, (Alkım, Ankara 1989) and Volkan and Itzkowitz, pp. 128-157, for a radical perspective, see “Kıbrıs Sorunu”, **Birikim**, I:77, Sept. 1995

⁵ prominent books of Birand are **30 Sıcak Gün** (Milliyet, İstanbul:1984) and **Diyet**, (Milliyet, İstanbul 1985)

⁶ This chronology has been prepared by using Turkish newspapers during January 1997 and in order to sustain a certain limit of objectivity, **Cyprus Chronology of Events, 1997** Web site of www.glavx.org

⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the political islam, see Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, **Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası** (Alan, İstanbul, 1985), Ahmet Yücekök, **Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset**, (Gerçek, İstanbul, 1983) and Binnaz Toprak, "Surviving Modernization", **Il Politico**, vol. LVI, n.1, 1991

⁸ For a closer analysis of election campaigns of 1995 elections, see Mehmet Sağnak, **Medya-Politik**, (Eti, İstanbul, 1996).

⁹ For a review of rule of the Welfare Party and its breakdown, see the Economist “The Increasing Loneliness of Being Turkey”, July 19, 1997; Sam Seibert, “Between Allah and the Army”, **Newsweek** June 30, 1997 and Christopher de Ballaigue; “Turkey's Top Post Eludes Çiller”; **The Independent**, June 21, 1997. For speculation about banning of the WP and its aftermath see Sabah, “Şimdi 'Fazilet' zamanı”, December 18, 1997; Fatih Çekirge, “Derin Refah'ın Sessizliği”, Sabah, December 24, 1997 and Mehmet Ali Birand, “Refah, Ne Dese Kapatılacak”, Sabahi August 6, 1997.

¹⁰ This meeting is available in Tutanak Dergisi, Vol:19, Meeting:45